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Judging Judges Fifty Years After—Was Judge Julius
Hoffman’s Conduct So Different?
Bennett L. Gershman*
In Chicago, Illinois—and in courtrooms across the United States—
judicial misconduct has affected trial outcomes as long as there have been
trials. While Judge Julius Hoffman’s conduct in the “Chicago Eight” trial is
an egregious example of judicial behavior toward criminal defendants, this
piece’s examination of at least ten different categories of misconduct in
dozens of cases makes the argument that misbehavior by judges is less of an
exception to the rule of impartiality than the thinking public might know. In
considering these brazen examples, practitioners and academics alike can
evaluate how to best confront the extent to which conduct like Judge
Hoffman’s permeates our justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
It began as the “Chicago Eight” trial, ended as the “Chicago Seven”
* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University.
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trial, and for five months in between became the most spectacular,
uproarious, and dysfunctional criminal trial in U.S. history.1 Daily, it
resembled a courtroom carnival—a bizarre amalgam of law, revelry,
politics, mischief, and an erratic judge who was unable to control the
courtroom or himself. The fiftieth anniversary of that trial is the catalyst
for the Southeastern Conference of Law Schools’s panel discussion on
judges and trials. The Chicago Eight trial was unique in tone, context, and
performance. Whether it provides any meaningful basis to study judges
and trials is unclear. For as this Essay shows, Judge Julius Hoffman’s
egregious conduct was not that different from hundreds of other judges,
before and since.
Judge Hoffman’s conduct was heavily criticized by the Seventh Circuit
for numerous deficiencies: (1) failing to conduct a more extensive voir
dire into the attitudes of prospective jurors given the extraordinary setting
involving nation-wide protests against the Vietnam War, the extensive
attention in the media to the youth culture, and the aggressive actions of
the Chicago police;2 (2) communicating privately with jurors during their
deliberations without making a record or alerting the defense;3 (3)
preventing the defense from presenting expert witnesses to testify on
crowd dynamics and police tactics relating to crowd control;4 and (4)
excluding exculpatory statements by some of the defendants relating to
their state of mind while traveling to Chicago.5
But by far the most enduring image from that trial was Judge
Hoffman’s antagonistic and abusive conduct toward the defendants, their
lawyers, and courtroom spectators.6 As the Seventh Circuit remarked,
“Trial decorum often fell victim to dramatic and emotionally
inflammatory episodes.”7 The most inflammatory episode was Judge
Hoffman’s brutal treatment of defendant Bobby Seale, whose insistence
on representing himself incited Judge Hoffman to order him bound and

1. See generally CONSPIRACY IN THE STREETS: THE EXTRAORDINARY TRIAL OF THE CHICAGO
EIGHT (Jon Wiener ed. 2006); JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1993); see also
United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972) (Seven defendants were convicted of
violating the 1968 federal Anti-Riot Act for their alleged violent encounters with police in streets
and parks during the Democratic party’s national convention in Chicago in the last week of August
of 1968.).
2. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 368–69.
3. Id. at 377–80.
4. Id. at 383–85.
5. Id. at 380–82.
6. Id. at 385–91 (“[W]e are unable to approve the trial in this case as fulfilling the standards of
our system of justice.”). The appellate court also found that the prosecutors engaged in serious and
reversible misconduct. See id. at 389–91.
7. Id. at 385.
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gagged.8 Stoking fear of a breakdown in the proceedings, Judge Hoffman
commanded nineteen marshals to be stationed around the courtroom,
which gave the trial an aura of military-like repression. Judge Hoffman
displayed throughout the trial an unremitting hostility toward the
defendants and their lawyers.9 He repeatedly and gratuitously demeaned
defense counsel, often in the presence of the jury, insinuating
sarcastically and without justification that they were inept and
untrustworthy.10 His evidentiary rulings almost always favored the
prosecution. As the Seventh Circuit observed, Judge Hoffman’s conduct
“must have telegraphed to the jury the judge’s contempt for the
defense.”11
Some of us on this panel undoubtedly have appeared before soulmates
of Julius Hoffman; I know I have. As Professor Abbe Smith notes wryly,
“Too many [judges] are mean-spirited and arrogant, going out of their
way to insult, ridicule, and demean those who come before them.”12
Professor Smith’s grim account of bad judges exemplifies the toxic
environment that exists in many courtrooms in America where the
conduct of judges is not very different from Judge Hoffman’s—they
abuse litigants, intervene in the trial to skew the fairness of proceedings,
and undermine the public’s trust in the integrity of trials.13 But unlike
Judge Hoffman, most of these judges are anonymities, their misconduct
lying buried in the vast flotsam of Westlaw reports, much like the
misconduct of prosecutors.14
The foundation of any rational system of justice requires judges to be
fair and impartial.15 Judges must conduct themselves with dignity and
8. Seale’s case was later severed from the other defendants, hence the change in the popular
designation of the trial from “Chicago 8” to “Chicago 7.” Id.
9. Id. at 385–86. The Seventh Circuit noted: “[I]n considering complaints concerning the
conduct of the trial judge and prosecuting attorneys we have avoided holding them responsible for
conduct made reasonably necessary by the conditions at the trial arising from the activity of others.”
Id. at 385.
10. Id. at 387–88.
11. Id. at 387. Judge Hoffman also held several of the defendants and lawyers in contempt. The
charges were later vacated. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
12. Abbe Smith, Judges as Bullies, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253, 253 (2017).
13. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (describing
“incompetent, self-indulgent, abusive, or corrupt [judges who] terrorize courtrooms, impair the
functioning of the legal system, and undermine public confidence in the law”).
14. The same debate over whether prosecutors engage in “misconduct” or “error” also appears
in commentaries about judges. See, e.g., Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial
Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245
(2004).
15. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT rr. 2.2–2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007); Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (“[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”).
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patience and not demean, harass, or denigrate persons who appear before
them. Although a judge is a central figure in U.S. legal justice and has the
duty to take an active role in a trial (and even comment on the
evidence),16 the judge must use this power carefully and responsibly.
Although a judge at a trial is allowed to question witnesses to elicit facts,
clarify issues, and facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the
proceedings,17 the judge should never assume the role of an advocate, or
impair the ability of the lawyers to represent their clients diligently and
effectively. Judicial neutrality is a paramount feature of a rational legal
system; it promotes a fair trial and engenders public confidence in the
integrity of the justice system.18
Despite these lofty goals, trial judges too often engage in conduct quite
similar to that of Judge Hoffman. Too often they display bias, flout the
dignity and decorum of the courtroom, demean and insult counsel, and
thereby impair a defendant’s right to a fair trial.19 Appellate review, as
occurred after the Chicago Eight trial, occasionally corrects the most
flagrant abuses. But judicial review is a limited and uncertain remedy;
too often criminal convictions are upheld despite serious abuses by the
trial judge.
The cases below illustrate how trial judges in various ways assumed
the role of an advocate, interfered aggressively in the proceedings, and
skewed the delicate courtroom balance that the adversarial system seeks
to promote. Judges can do this by interrogating witnesses, especially the
defendant, with questions and comments that demonstrate hostility,
skepticism, and disparagement;20 bolstering the credibility of prosecution
witnesses with leading, reinforcing, and reassuring questions that in

16. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (stating that a judge “may express
his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted
to their determination”).
17. FED. R. EVID. 614(b).
18. According to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards:
The trial judge should be a model of dignity and impartiality. The judge should exercise
restraint over his or her conduct and utterances. The judge should remain neutral
regarding the proceedings at all times, suppress personal predilections, control his or her
temper and emotions, and be patient, respectful, and courteous to defendants, jurors,
witnesses, victims, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
The judge should not permit any person in the courtroom to embroil him or her in
conflict, and should otherwise avoid personal conduct which tends to demean the
proceedings or to undermine judicial authority in the courtroom.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 7 (3d ed.
2000) (Standard 6-3.4: Courtroom Demeanor).
19. See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT (3d ed.
2015).
20. Id. §§ 1-2(a)–(b), at 6–16.
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effect vouch for the witness’s truthfulness;21 employing strong-arm
tactics that denigrate a defendant or his witness’s character and
credibility;22 coercing witnesses into giving certain answers;23
intimidating witnesses to decline to testify; 24 making gratuitous
comments that display hostility, disbelief, disparagement, ridicule, and
favoritism;25 undermining a defendant’s constitutional rights by
commenting on the defendant’s failure to testify and the presumption of
innocence;26 and impairing the ability of defense counsel to defend her
client by engaging in criticism, abuse, and threats—often in the jury’s
presence—that disparage counsel’s integrity and competence.27
I. RANDOM ACCOUNTS OF POST-CHICAGO EIGHT MISCONDUCT BY TRIAL
JUDGES
Judicial misconduct that taints the fairness of the trial and corrodes the
integrity of the justice system occurs with disturbing frequency, and
corrective remedies are limited.28 Consider the following cases, selected
from many hundreds of cases, involving misconduct by judges which
prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial.29
A. Forcibly Restraining Defense Counsel
After a defense lawyer engaged in a heated exchange with the judge
over an evidentiary ruling, the judge, feeling insulted by a lawyer who

21. Id. § 1-2(c), at 18–21.
22. Id. § 1-2(b)(4), at 17.
23. Id. § 1-2(d), at 22–23.
24. Id.
25. Id. §§ 1-3(a)–(f), at 27–35.
26. Id. § 1-3(g), at 35–36.
27. Id. §§ 1-4(a)–(b), at 37–41.
28. This is not to suggest that judges are never accountable for their misconduct. They are
reversed occasionally, and disciplined. But judges are almost never disciplined for misconduct that
arises during a trial. See, e.g., In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982) (racial remarks during
conferences in chambers); In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1985) (racial comments during
sentencing); In re Waltemade, 409 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct. Judiciary 1975) (rude and insulting remarks
during court appearances); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d
603 (Wis. 1989) (abusive remarks during probation and other non-trial proceedings).
29. The identity of the trial judge is usually apparent from the synopsis of the case, which
appears at the beginning of the appellate court’s written decision, and which identifies the court of
original jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted, the nature of the conviction, the identity
of the trial judge, and the holding by the appellate court. Curiously, however, there are occasions
when the identity of the trial judge, whose conduct is criticized by the appellate court, is omitted
from the synopsis, possibly to shield the judge from being identified and embarrassed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50 (2d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Robinson, 635 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Hickman, 592
F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979).
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had a long history of trying to bait judges, ordered the U.S. marshals, in
the jury’s presence, to handcuff the lawyer behind her back and remove
her from the courtroom, and then in the presence of the jury stated:
Well, she doesn’t know how to behave herself in a courtroom. It’s like
having a bunch of children, screaming and crying and yelling at the top
of her voice in total disrespect for the Court. She doesn’t—I won’t have
it in my court. She’s trashing the United States, and that doesn’t happen
in my Court.30

B. Becoming a Surrogate Prosecutor
A judge, renowned as a combative prosecutor before he ascended to
the bench, apparently forgot that he was a judge and continued his
prosecutorial advocacy after his ascension to the bench. In one murder
trial, he interrupted and undermined defense counsel’s attempt to
impeach a police expert witness by asking leading questions to prove that
gun residue evidence almost never can be discovered from a suspect; that
lifting fingerprints from a gun almost never can be found; that a gun could
not accidentally discharge by falling to the ground; that the gun was
possessed by the defendant; and that a hat described by witnesses as worn
by the shooter was owned by the defendant.31 By asking hundreds of
continuous and uninterrupted questions of the defendant, his witnesses,
and prosecution witnesses, the judge destroyed the credibility of the
defendant and bolstered the prosecution’s case far better than the
prosecutor did.32
C. Undermining Defense Counsel’s Ability to Defend
In a federal prosecution of a state senator, the trial judge displayed
overt hostility to the defendant and his counsel. The judge ordered
defense counsel to write out his objections, thereby allowing the
witness’s testimony to be heard before defense counsel could intervene;
interfered multiple times in the questioning of defendant and his
witnesses; criticized defense counsel’s questions as “‘improper’ and

30. United States v. Elder, 309 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2002) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting
transcript of trial proceedings).
31. People v. Ellis, 404 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
32. Id. For more examples of this judge’s similar conduct, see People v. Yut Wai Tom, 422
N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1981) (conviction reversed for same judge’s excessive participation in
examination of witnesses); People v. Tartaglia, 324 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1974) (conviction reversed
for same judge’s unnecessary questions of witnesses and altercations with defense counsel); People
v. Tucker, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (conviction reversed for same judge’s improper
intervention in defense counsel’s questioning of witnesses); People v. Ohlstein, 387 N.Y.S.2d 860
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (conviction reversed for same judge’s undue advocacy on behalf of
prosecution).
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‘completely without merit’”; ordered defense counsel to “stop
mumbling” and indicated that his questions were “a bore and a waste of
time”; and implied “several times that counsel was ‘misleading’ the
jury.”33
D. Destroying Defendant’s Credibility
Defendant, charged with carrying a drug-filled briefcase into the
United States, testified that he had assisted an elderly passenger at the
airport baggage terminal by carrying the passenger’s briefcase, which he
believed belonged to that passenger on a baggage trolley. 34 The court
interrupted his testimony:
The Court: Did you have a trolley?
The Defendant: Yes, I do.
The Court: Did you have the trolley when you went through
Immigration?
The Defendant: Yes, I do.
The Court: If I told you [that] you can’t take the trolley when you go
through Immigration, would you believe me?
The Defendant: (No response.)
The Court: You only get the trolley when you go to the customs area,
don’t you?35

The court contradicted the defendant on the details of his trip:
The Court: You said you went [to Nigeria] the latter part of October?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: How long did you stay?
The Defendant: Just about a week.
The Court: Two weeks?
The Defendant: A week.
The Court: Then you came back?
The Defendant: I came back, yes.
The Court: How come you came back November 30, if it was only a
week, and you went in October?
....
The Defendant: I do make a mistake.
The Court: Okay. I just want to make sure.36

After defense counsel elicited helpful testimony from the
government’s narcotics agent that sometimes “drug lords . . . hide the
narcotics with unsuspecting travelers,” the court intervened:

33.
34.
35.
36.

United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985).
United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 382.
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The Court: Is it often?
The Witness: Based on my experience I would have to answer that no.
But it has happened.
The Court: Would you say no because a drug lord wouldn’t want to lose
the drugs[?]
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: If you don’t know the person you give it to it could be lost
and you may never get it back?
The Witness: That’s correct.
The Court: A lot of money is involved.
The Witness: Yes. They have a vest[ed] interest for one purpose. That
is to make money. They are interested in seeing the narcotics
delivered.37

E. Sarcasm and Comedy
A defendant seeking to establish an alibi was subjected to the judge’s
sarcastic and demeaning interrogation:
The Court: Was that the Tommy Hunt—The Tommy Hunt that was on
the stand, is that the Tommy Hunt you say you met in Chock Full O’
Nuts?
The Witness: That’s the Tommy Hunt.
The Court: That Tommy Hunt?
The Witness: That Tommy Hunt.
The Court: All right.
....
The Court: You saw him in Chock Full O’ Nuts on February 8th?
The Witness: February 8th.
The Court: 1977?
The Witness: Right.
The Court: Chock Full O’ Nuts, 50th Street and Broadway?
The Witness: Right.
The Court: City of New York?
The Witness: Right.
The Court: Right here in the city?
The Witness: Manhattan.38
37. Id. (second brackets in original).
38. People v. Tucker, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The judge clearly was making
an effort to be funny. Judges often like to appear as comedians before a jury. Judge Hoffman
occasionally made attempts to be funny. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 387 (7th Cir.
1972) (“Taken individually any one [of Judge Hoffman’s comments] was not very significant and
might be disregarded as a harmless attempt at humor. But cumulatively, they must have telegraphed
to the jury the judge’s contempt for the defense.”). For commentary on judicial humor, see Marshall
Rudolph, Note, Judicial Humor: A Laughing Matter?, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 175 (1989).
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F. Benevolent Treatment of Prosecution Witness
In a prosecution for sexual assault of a young girl, the trial judge
offered the child ice cream if she promised to tell “real things” and not
“pretend things,” at the conclusion of her direct examination in which she
identified the defendant as the perpetrator.39 He rewarded her with ice
cream in the presence of the jury, stating reassuringly: “I told you . . . if
you told real things and not pretend things, I would give you an ice cream,
right?”40 Then, after cross examination during which the child ate her ice
cream while repeating her identification of the defendant, the judge
remarked:
The Court: Did you tell us everything that was real?
The Witness: Yeah.
The Court: Are you sure?
The Witness: Yeah.
The Court: For sure?
The Witness: Uh-huh.
The Court: You didn’t tell us no pretend stuff, right?
The Witness: No.
The Court: Okay. Here, wait a minute. Take those. Goodbye.
The judge, then in the presence of the jury, then gave the [child] a
lollipop and two cookies.41

G. Insults and Abuse
A judge in a murder trial urged the prosecutor to ask the witness a
question even though the prosecutor believed that the answer would be
hearsay:
The Court: Is there any reason why you don’t ask [the witness] what
[another witness, Miss Reiland,] said to her?
[The Prosecutor]: Because technically it is hearsay.
Court: It is admissible.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, with all due respect, I would rather just fight
[The Prosecutor] and not—
The Court: You know what, you’re not acting like[ ] a lawyer. We are
talking about—at least it has been established that this is an exciting
event, and it makes a whole lot more sense if the witness tells us what
was said to her. Now, don’t object anymore, [defense counsel], when
things are so obvious. Now, would you please ask her what Miss
Reiland said.42
39.
40.
41.
42.

State v. R.W., 491 A.2d 1304, 1306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 2006).
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The judge’s repeated interruptions of defense counsel’s questioning
often came in the form of insults in the jury’s presence. For instance, the
judge admonished defense counsel by stating: “You want to be an actor.
Be a lawyer.”43 Shortly thereafter, the judge added: “Don’t act like a
child . . . . You’re a lawyer”44 and “Would you please position yourself
and act like [a lawyer].”45 The judge accused defense counsel “of being
‘a smart aleck,’ of being ‘silly,’ and of ‘trying to create a furor.’”46 When
defense counsel appeared, at least in the judge’s mind, to be engaging in
a forbidden line of questioning, the following exchange resulted:
The Court: Mr. Hart, you know you’re exhausting all of us. Mr. Hart,
do you have any more questions for this witness before he is excused?
Mr. Hart: Yes, I do, Judge.
The Court: I don’t know why you keep doing these things over, and
over again. That was a terrible thing, terrible thing for you to do.
Mr. Hart: I disagree.
Court: Doesn’t make any difference whether you agree or not.47

H. Racial Remarks
Derogatory remarks by judges can infect the trial. During a trial of a
Haitian defendant, the trial judge remarked about the defendant:
I think it’s a shame people come here and do not try to learn our
language. However, they might learn something if they sit here for
awhile.
It is important to make an effort so you can be able to understand. It
is incumbent upon all of you to go ahead and make an attempt to learn
English.48

In a federal drug trafficking trial, the same judge said the following about
Colombians:
They don’t have too much regard for judges. They only killed 32
Chief Judges in that nation. Their regard for the judicial system, the men
who run their laws, I’m glad I’m in America. That’s why I pledge
allegiance to the flag. My mother and father came from Italy.
....
. . . [These defendants] should have stayed where they were. Nobody
told them to come here. I’m one of the fellows who makes United States
citizens. Nobody tells them to come and get involved in cocaine. Don’t

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1180–81.
Saintjour v. State, 534 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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give me that theory. My father came over with $3 in his pocket. He has
a Federal Judge as a son.49

I. Gratuitous Interventions
Consider the following remarks by judges in the jury’s presence:
All right. I don’t believe I want to hear any more testimony from this
[defense] witness. I want to certify in the record that the Court wouldn’t
believe him on oath, and I don’t want to waste the jury’s time taking
any more testimony from him.50

***
[To the prosecutor]: Step over here with the knife, don’t leave that
there. Look, I don’t want that exhibit left anywhere where [the
defendant] can get to it.51

***
[S]it down and relax. . . . You’re a victim. [To the jury]: He’s a victim
of a crime who came here to describe as best he could. [The jury] can
realize if they were in his place they may be could not do so well.52

J. Violating Rights
Judges have made comments in the jury’s presence that impair
defendants’ constitutional rights in various ways: interrupting defense
counsel’s attempt to impeach a witness by stating that counsel could put
“your people” on the stand to contradict the witness;53 admonishing a
defendant who had been gesturing toward the jury by stating that “[i]f
you wanted to testify you could have taken the stand;”54 and admonishing
a smiling defendant that “[i]f you disagree with something you can take
the stand and testify yourself.”55 A judge stated in the presence of the jury
that he knew that a defense witness who was associated with the
defendant was a convicted drug dealer.56 Judges have implied that the
defendant has the burden of proof,57 and asserted that the defendant’s
silence at the time of arrest could be used to discredit his exculpatory
testimony.58
49. United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Stevens v. United States, 306 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1962).
51. State v. Wendel, 532 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
52. Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (third alteration in original),
aff’d, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
53. Davis v. United States, 357 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1966).
54. United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 988 (7th Cir. 1997).
55. People v. Crabtree, 515 N.E.2d 1323, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
56. United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 1983).
57. People v. Iskandar, 426 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
58. Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1985).
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II. DISCUSSION
The above cases describe serious misconduct by judges that
undermined the fairness of the trial. Several of the cases resulted in
reversals, and others in strong reprimands. But these cases are not isolated
deviations. The conduct described in these examples occurs often in
courtrooms throughout the country. And although a judge’s misconduct
occasionally results in a reversal or appellate rebuke, as in the Chicago
Eight trial, a judge’s misbehavior almost never results in discipline of the
judge.
The rare appellate reversal based on a judge’s misconduct requires the
conduct to be “so prejudicial” that it denies the defendant a fair trial.59
However, determining whether a judge’s misconduct reaches that high
level of prejudice is rarely a simple or straightforward task. In all of the
above examples the judge’s misconduct, as in the Chicago Eight trial,
almost certainly contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict. Still, when proof
of a defendant’s guilt is strong, an appellate court will almost always
defer to the trial judge and conclude that the judge’s misconduct did not
substantially affect the result.
The Constitution,60 statutes,61 case law,62 and ethical codes63 mandate
that trial judges conduct themselves fairly and impartially. The excesses
by Judge Hoffman in the Chicago Eight trial, and the conduct of the
judges described in the above examples, are plainly at variance with a
judge’s legal and ethical duty to ensure that a criminal defendant receives
a fair trial. To be sure, a judge is not simply a moderator or umpire of the
trial. A judge has a duty to take an active role in the proceedings to ensure
that trials are conducted in a fair, orderly, and expeditious manner. But it
is well recognized that a judge has an enormous influence over the jury,64
and must be exceedingly careful not to engage in conduct that could
59. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (Due process is violated
when a judge presides in a case that would “offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,” or would “lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused.”).
61. FED R. CRIM. P. 23 (trial by jury or by judge); FED. R. EVID. 611 (court should exercise
reasonable control over and mode of examining witnesses and presenting evidence).
62. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 471–72 (1933) (criticizing a judge’s remarks to a
jury).
63. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990) (judge should
maintain professional competence, require order and decorum in proceedings, and should be
patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others).
64. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470 (“The influence of the trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and
properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may
prove controlling.’”).

2019]

Judging Judges Fifty Years Later

851

significantly influence the jury’s determination.
A criminal trial is a complex event that puts a heavy burden on a judge.
Administering a trial, especially a lengthy trial, demands considerable
intellectual, physical, and emotional skills. The judge must supervise
many diverse and often competing factions: prosecutors, defense
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, media, spectators, and the public. Courts and
disciplinary bodies recognize “the enormous pressures placed upon our
trial judges by their ever-expanding dockets and the increasing
complexity of modern trials.”65 A judge facing these pressures must
ensure that trial procedures are followed correctly, that evidence is
received properly according to the rules, that prosecutors and defense
lawyers conduct themselves competently and respectfully, that spectators
in the courtroom behave, that time is not wasted, and that the jury is
properly empaneled, attended to, and instructed correctly on the law. It is
therefore not surprising that appellate courts and disciplinary bodies treat
trial judges with considerable deference and are reluctant to second-guess
or criticize the judge’s conduct when it reasonably appears to have been
occasioned by the pressures of a difficult trial or precipitated by the
behavior of the participants.
As noted above, as supervisor of the trial, the judge has a duty to take
an active role in the proceedings, which may include the questioning of
witnesses when necessary to elicit facts, clarify issues, or facilitate the
orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.66 Given that a judge is
authorized to intervene in the proceedings, reviewing courts typically
consider the nature of the intervention, the reason the judge intervened,
the extent and aggressiveness of the intervention, whether the judge’s
involvement was isolated or recurring, whether the judge’s intervention
was evenhanded or favored one party, and whether the reviewing body is
able to detect, even at a distance and from reviewing the trial transcript,
the manner and tone of the judge’s intervention, and whether it conveyed
skepticism, hostility, or favoritism.
But given that the judge’s intervention can slant the proceedings in
favor of one party, the judge must be extremely careful when deciding
whether to intervene. Even if the judge decides to participate in the factfinding process, he should avoid conduct or remarks that suggest an
opinion of the facts or the credibility of witnesses.67 Thus, as in Case B,68
65. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985).
66. FED. R. EVID. 614(b) (“The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the
witness.”).
67. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470 (“The influence of the trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and
properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may
prove controlling.’”).
68. See supra Part I.B.
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the judge throughout the trial assumed the role of the prosecutor and in
hundreds of unnecessary, repetitive, and uninterrupted questions virtually
destroyed the credibility of the defendant and his witnesses as well as
thwarted defense counsel’s efforts to impeach the prosecution’s expert
witness. Although the judge previously was a renowned prosecutor
famous for his cross-examination skills, when he assumed the role of
judge, he shed the role of a prosecutor and was required to resist the
impulse to intervene for the prosecution, which, regrettably, he was
unable to do.
Similarly, in Case D,69 the judge apparently believed that the defendant
was giving contrived and fabricated testimony and was not content to
allow the adversary system to expose the defendant’s falsehoods. Perhaps
believing that the adversary system was not operating properly to flush
out the truth, the judge took it upon himself to perform that role. But this
is not the judge’s role.
Contrasting with these cases involving a judge’s aggressive efforts to
discredit the defense, the judge in Case F intruded into the proceedings
to bolster the testimony of the prosecution’s key witness.70 The judge
gratuitously and beneficently reassured the child sexual assault victim of
her ability to give truthful testimony and then praised and rewarded her
for her truthful testimony. It is inconceivable that the jury did not view
the judge’s interaction with this witness as anything other than the judge’s
pronouncement that she was telling the truth about being sexually
assaulted by the defendant. In all of these cases it was clear that the
judge’s intervention displayed prominently the judge’s attitude toward
the witnesses—ridicule, disbelief, disparagement, or favoritism.
Even though the judge has some leeway to intervene in the fact-finding
process, and even to comment on the evidence,71 there is no comparable
allowance for the judge to make gratuitous, disparaging, and partisan
comments—especially in the jury’s presence—that expressly or
impliedly reveal the judge’s opinion about the witnesses or the evidence.
To be sure, judges are not automatons, and they occasionally make
inappropriate remarks. Indeed, reviewing courts regularly observe that
given the pressures on the trial judge, especially when the trial is long,
participants are many, and the issues are complex, “even conscientious
members of the bench . . . [will] vent to their frustrations by displaying
anger and partisanship, when ordinarily they are able to suppress these
69. See supra Part I.D.
70. See supra Part I.F.
71. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469 (“[A judge] may express his opinion upon the facts, provided he
makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination.”).
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characteristics.”72 And appellate courts routinely point out that there is a
“modicum of quick temper that must be allowed even [to] judges.”73
However, reviewing bodies extend no tolerance, nor should they, to a
judge’s remarks that plainly disparage a witness’s credibility, or are
belittling, denigrating, and humiliating of witnesses or lawyers.
The Chicago Eight trial is a pristine example of how inflammatory
remarks by the judge “telegraphed to the jury the judge’s contempt for
the defense.”74 Case E, noted above, also reveals how a judge’s attempt
at comedy in reality constituted a scathing ridicule of a defendant’s alibi
and showed the judge’s undisguised contempt for the defense.75 Case H
captures a judge’s racially derogatory remarks,76 and Case I describes
gratuitous remarks by judges that vilify a defense witness, demonize the
defendant, and laud the crime victim.77 And Case J describes remarks that
eroded the defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent and to the
presumption of innocence.78
Probably the most common ground for reversal is bias by the judge. A
judge’s remarks, particularly when the jury is present, can clearly reveal
the judge’s bias. This was evident in the Chicago Eight trial and in many
of the cases described above. Why some judges expose their bias so
openly is not entirely clear. Most judges are able to keep their emotions
in check, or at least have the good sense to excuse the jury before venting
their feelings. But many judges are simply unable to control their
emotions, and, as the above cases demonstrate, gratuitously intervene in
the proceedings with sarcasm, ridicule, hostility, and abuse. The fact that
a judge may have been an aggressive litigator should not prevent the
judge from maintaining objectivity. Many judges have been prosecutors
and criminal defense lawyers, but when they become judges they must
become neutral participants. And although aggressive lawyers frequently
try to bait judges to lose control, as in the Chicago Eight trial, the judge
must not take the bait.
A judge’s mistreatment of defense counsel may have the greatest
capacity to destroy a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and his

72. United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954). See also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555–56 (1994) (“[E]xpressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger . . .
are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as
federal judges, sometimes display.”).
74. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 387 (7th Cir. 1972).
75. See supra Part I.E.
76. See supra Part I.H.
77. See supra Part I.I.
78. See supra Part I.J.
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Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Although judges
must display patience and respect toward counsel, judges are only human,
and as noted above, the pressures of a trial and the conduct of the
attorneys may cause even the most temperate judge to vent irritation and
annoyance.79 But some judges are simply unable to control their
emotions. Judge Hoffman’s harsh abuse and humiliation of the defense
lawyers in the Chicago Eight trial is probably the most indelible image of
a judge crossing the line. But Judge Hoffman’s conduct is not unique. Of
course, ordering the defense lawyer to be arrested and forcibly removed
from the courtroom, as shown in Case A,80 is an extraordinary example
of a judge’s crossing the line, especially when done in the jury’s presence.
Thwarting counsel’s ability to effectively defend his client, and harshly
criticizing counsel’s competence, as described in Cases C81 and G,82
severely damaged these lawyers’ ability to defend their clients
effectively.
CONCLUSION
The fiftieth anniversary of the Chicago Eight trial is the impetus for
thinking about the conduct of judges. Judge Hoffman’s conduct, while
egregious, is not unique. As shown above, many judges engage in serious
misconduct. This Essay has described and critiqued various types of
judicial misconduct that may jeopardize the fairness of the trial, and the
fitness of the judge to continue to serve. A judge’s intemperate conduct,
while never condoned, will likely be reviewed with considerable
deference to the judge because of the perceived difficulties in the judge’s
administration of the trial and the pressures on the judge to control the
conduct of highly competitive adversaries. An appellate court, familiar
with trial proceedings, will more likely be able to infer from the context
of a trial a judge’s hostility, disbelief, sarcasm, inquisitorialness, and bias
than a disciplinary body. And while an appellate court is focused on the
impact of the judge’s conduct on the fairness of a trial, the disciplinary
body is more likely to focus on the judge’s fitness to continue to serve as
a judge. Conduct by a judge that is clearly unwarranted might appear to
an appellate court not to have had an undue impact on a jury. However,
that same conduct might be viewed by a disciplinary body, not as an
isolated deviation or a regrettable lapse, but as conduct that calls into
question the judge’s ability, fitness, and character to be a judge. But since
an appellate reversal for misconduct by the judge is rare, and discipline

79.
80.
81.
82.

United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1973).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.G.
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almost never happens, the misconduct of the judge at a criminal trial will
continue to be memorialized by the trial of the Chicago Eight.

